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2017年10月5日 星期四

CAFC en banc:多方複審程序中修改請求項,改由請求人證明其不具可專利性:Aqua Prod. v. Matal (Fed. Cir., October 4, 2017) (en banc)

10月4日美國聯邦巡迴上訴法院以全院庭審判決,針對 "在多方複審程序中修改的請求項,究竟是誰就其有效與否負舉證責任" 此一問題做出見解,推翻了之前 "應由專利權人舉證證明修改的請求項有效" 的見解,改為 "應由無效程序的請求人舉證證明修改的請求項無效"。

此一見解關係重大,而且是個值得上訴到聯邦最高法院的議題。光看法官們吵成一團,就知道這議題有多複雜了吧。


判決文:AQUA PRODUCTS, INC. v. MATAL (Fed. Cir., October 4, 2017) (en banc)


歷史背景

專利 US 8,273,183 與泳池自動清潔機器相關。請求人Zodiac Pool Sys., Inc.由於在地方法院被Aqua告專利侵權,請求美國專利商標局對該專利展開多方複審程序 (Inter-partes review) 。美國專利商標局嗣後決定對請求項 1–9、13、14、16、與19–21展開多方複審程序。

多方複審程序進行到一半,專利權人Aqua請求修改請求項1、8與20 (可能是因為研判若不修改,請求項真的要無效了),但美國專利商標局拒絕Aqua的修改請求,理由是Aqua沒有證明修改後的請求項具有可專利性。

Aqua上訴到聯邦巡迴上訴法院,主張依美國專利法第316(e)條,自己並不負修改後的請求項具有可專利性的證明義務。聯邦巡迴上訴法院之前引用了自己的判決先例 (Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2015)),在2016年的判決中不接受Aqua的說法,確認了美國專利商標局的決定。

於是Aqua請求全院庭審,聯邦巡迴上訴法院受理。Aqua問了兩個問題:
(a) When the patent owner moves to amend its claims under 35 U.S.C. § 316(d), may the PTO require the patent owner to bear the burden of persuasion, or a burden of production, regarding patentability of the amended claims as a condition of allowing them? Which burdens are permitted under 35 U.S.C. § 316(e)?
(b) When the petitioner does not challenge the patentability of a proposed amended claim, or the Board thinks the challenge is inadequate, may the Board sua sponte raise patentability challenges to such a claim? If so, where would the burden of persuasion, or a burden of production, lie?

相關法條

35 U.S.C. 316 (d)
(d) Amendment of the Patent.—
(1)In general.—During an inter partes review instituted under this chapter, the patent owner may file 1 motion to amend the patent in 1 or more of the following ways:
35 U.S.C. 316 (e)
(e)Evidentiary Standards.—
In an inter partes review instituted under this chapter, the petitioner shall have the burden of proving a proposition of unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence.

37 CFR 42.20 (c)
(c)Burden of proof. The moving party has the burden of proof to establish that it is entitled to the requested relief.
37 CFR 42.121 (a)
(a)Motion to amend. A patent owner may file one motion to amend a patent, but only after conferring with the Board.

全院庭審見解

1. 關於修改後請求項的可專利性,舉證責任何時發生?

聯邦巡迴上訴法院現在認為,專利有效性的舉證責任問題,在修改後的請求項符合316(d)的程序之後,先進入到複審程序中然後由316(e)來規範
For these reasons, we believe that the only reasonable reading of the burden imposed on the movant in § 316(d) is that the patent owner must satisfy the Board that the statutory criteria in § 316(d)(1)(a)–(b) and § 316(d)(3) are met and that any reasonable procedural obligations imposed by the Director are satisfied before the amendment is entered into the IPR. Only once the proposed amended claims are entered into the IPR does the question of burdens of proof or persuasion on propositions of unpatentability come into play. It is at that point, accordingly, that § 316(e) governs, placing that burden onto the petitioner.  (判決文第24頁)

2. 關於修改後請求項的可專利性,到底誰負舉證責任?

這就是重點了,我們跳過十幾頁的論理,直接看結論吧。

現在聯邦巡迴上訴法院說,雖然全院庭審的判決沒有拿到多數票 (甚麼?),但我們相信,我們相信,我們相信 (跳針三次?) 國會的意思是由請求人負舉證責任
Accordingly, while we recognize that our views on this question have not garnered a majority of the available votes, we believe that Congress intended that the petitioner bear the burden of persuasion as to all claims in an IPR, whether original or amended. Because we believe that “the intent of Congress is clear” in § 316(d) and § 316(e), moreover, we believe “that [should be] the end of the matter.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842 (emphasis added).  (判決文第42頁)
我還是第一次看到全院庭審判決中,都寫到結論了,還一直重複跳針 "we believe" 的。看來聯邦巡迴上訴法院的法官這次很沒自信耶,美國專利局局長,請上訴到最高法院吧。


3. 美國專利商標局的規定,有解釋說誰應該負舉證責任嗎?

依最高法院1984年在 Chevron 案 (Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)) 中建構的框架,行政單位可以自己解釋法律的意思。所以如果美國專利商標局曾經解釋過專利法第316(e)的意思,那法院就需要援引Chevron框架來處理本案。

關於這點法官們吵成一團。讓我們再次跳過十幾頁的論理過程,直接看結論吧。

法院說 "沒有 (一堆法官說有....) !所以本案無援引Chevron框架的基礎":
We therefore conclude that the Board’s decisions do not reflect “a reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing interests . . . [where] the agency considered the matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion, and the decision involves reconciling conflicting policies,” and, thus, conclude that no basis for deference under either Chevron or Auer exists.   (判決文第42頁)

結論:法官好挫折

本案判決文的倒數第二段變成抒情文了。法官覺得這程序一路走來好不容易好挫折。大家為了這個案子搞出一堆法律問題,然後吵成一團,但很多都跟本案核心問題無關,只是抽象思維 (cogitations) 而已啊:
This process has not been easy. We are proceeding without a full court, and those judges who are participating disagree over a host of issues. As frustrating as it is for all who put so much thought and effort into this matter, very little said over the course of the many pages that form the five opinions in this case has precedential weight. The only legal conclusions that support and define the judgment of the court are: (1) the PTO has not adopted a rule placing the burden of persuasion with respect to the patentability of amended claims on the patent owner that is entitled to deference; and (2) in the absence of anything that might be entitled deference, the PTO may not place that burden on the patentee. All the rest of our cogitations, whatever label we have placed on them, are just that—cogitations. Even our discussions on whether the statute is ambiguous are mere academic exercises.
看完我都笑了。類似的狀況現實世界很常發生的啊,法官們。確實這種事會讓真的想做事解決問題的人感到挫折,但也不需要直接寫在判決文本文裡吧。

簡單來講,往後專利權人在複審程序中修改請求項,須由請求複審的人來證明該修改的請求項無效,而不是由專利權人來證明該請求項有效。這案子其實就這麼簡單..... 不過很有可能會上訴到聯邦最高法院喔。大家再等等吧。


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